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An Employment Arbitration Agreement Does Not
Bar the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission From Seeking Victim-Specific Relief in
a Suit Alleging a Violation of Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act: Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Waffle
House, Inc.
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION - AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT -
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS - VICTIM-SPECIFIC RELIEF - The United
States Supreme Court held that the existence of an arbitration
agreement in an employment contract does not preclude the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission from seeking victim-
specific relief in a discrimination suit; The EEOC may seek victim-
specific relief when the alleged violation infringes on the em-
ployee's rights via Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Waffle House, Inc.,
534 U.S. 279 (2002).
Eric Baker, a prospective Waffle House employee, completed an
application for employment that included an arbitration clause to
settle "any dispute or claim" concerning his employment.1 Shortly
after becoming a grill operator at a Waffle House location, Baker
1. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279,
282 (2002); see also Appellant's Brief at 56, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(No. 99-1823). Waffle House required all employees to sign applications containing an
arbitration agreement. Id. The arbitration agreement signed by Baker read:
The parties agree that any dispute or claim concerning Applicant's employment with
Waffle House, Inc., or any subsidiary or Franchisee of Waffle House, Inc., or the
terms, conditions or benefits of such employment, including whether such dispute or
claim is arbitrable, will be settled by binding arbitration. The arbitration proceed-
ings shall be conducted under the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Ar-
bitration Association in effect at the time a demand for arbitration is made. A deci-
sion and award of the arbitrator made under the said rules shall be exclusive, final
and binding on both parties, their heirs, executors, administrators, successors and
assigns. The costs and expenses of the arbitration shall be borne evenly by the par-
ties.
Appellant's Brief at 59.
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suffered a seizure at work and was subsequently discharged.!
While Baker failed to initiate arbitration proceedings after his
discharge, he did file a timely complaint with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").3 The complaint alleged
that Waffle House discriminated against Baker in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). 4
The EEOC, on its own initiative and without Baker as a party,
filed an enforcement action against Waffle House in Federal Dis-
trict Court for the District of South Carolina.5 The complaint al-
leged that Baker was intentionally discharged because of his dis-
2. Appellant's Brief at 43-44. Baker had only worked for Waffle House for 16 days.
Id.
3. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 283.
4. Id.
5. Id. The EEOC did attempt to conciliate the dispute following its investigation. Id.
The EEOC brought its action pursuant to § 107(a) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1994),
and § 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, as added, 105 Stat. 1072, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)
(1994). Id.
Note: The original suit, brought by the EEOC on behalf of Baker, was referred to a
United States Magistrate Judge to determine whether Baker and Waffle House in fact
entered into an arbitration agreement. The judge denied Waffle House's motion to dismiss
and recommended that the arbitration agreement should be honored. On appeal, the dis-
trict court denied both the motion to dismiss and the motion to compel arbitration, citing
the fact that no employment contract existed between the parties when Baker decided to
take the position. Filing an interlocutory appeal, Waffle House questioned the district
court's denial of the motion to compel arbitration in an attempt to stay the EEOC from
bringing suit in court on Baker's behalf. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit first
determined that there was in fact an employment contract between the parties, disagreeing
with the District Court's determination that no contract was created. The court of appeals
examined cases on point from several other circuits, where the opinions varied signifi-
cantly. Appearing to agree with the logic developed in the Second Circuit, the court of
appeals determined that the EEOC could continue to pursue broad public interest relief,
but would have to refrain from pursuing victim-specific relief for Baker. See EEOC v. Waf-
fle House, 193 F.3d 805, 807-812.
6. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 283.
7. Id. at 283-84. The make-whole remedy for Baker included backpay, reinstate-
ment, compensatory damages and punitive damage. Id.
8. Id.
9. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805,
808(1999).
10. Waffle House, 193 F. 3d at 809.
11. Id. at 812. The majority explained their balancing test:
When the EEOC seeks 'made-whole' relief for a charging party, the federal policy fa-
voring enforcement of private arbitration agreements outweighs the EEOC's right to
proceed in federal court because in that circumstance, the EEOC's public interest is
minimal, as the EEOC seeks primarily to vindicate private, rather than public, inter-
ests. On the other hand, when the EEOC is pursuing large-scale injunctive relief, the
balance tips in favor of the EEOC enforcement efforts in federal court because the
public interest dominates the EEOC's action.
E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House
ability, in violation of the ADA.6 The EEOC requested both in-
junctive relief, to abolish the effects of Waffle House's previous
and current unlawful employment practices, and specific, make-
whole relief to compensate Baker.7
The district court denied Waffle House's motion tG stay the
EEOC's action under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") after
determining that no arbitration agreement existed in Baker's em-
ployment contract.8 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed, holding that the action against Waffle House by the
EEOC was prohibited by the arbitration clause because the EEOC
was not a party to the contract.' Balancing the EEOC's right to
proceed with the FAA's policy regarding the validity of arbitration
agreements, the court alternatively decided that in order to avoid
nullifying the arbitration agreement, the EEOC should be pre-
vented from pursuing victim-specific relief.10 Due to the signed
arbitration agreement between Baker and Waffle House, the court
limited the EEOC's remedy to injunctive relief."
Citing a split between the various courts of appeals on this is-
sue, 2 the Supreme Court granted the EEOC's petition for certio-
rari to determine whether an arbitration agreement between em-
ployer and employee limits the EEOC's ability to pursue victim-
specific judicial relief in a suit alleging the employer has violated
Title I of the ADA. 3 The majority, led by Justice Stevens in a 5 to
3 decision, held that the EEOC has exclusive statutory authority
to pursue victim specific relief once a charge has been filed. 4
The Supreme Court began its analysis by examining Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which granted the EEOC the author-
ity to enforce the ADA's rules concerning employment discrimina-
12. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 285
13. Id.
14. Id. at 298.
15. Id. at 285-86. Section 12117 (a) of Title VII provides:
The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in sections 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6,
2000e-8 and 2000e-9 of this title shall be the powers, remedies, and procedures this
subchapter provides to the Commission, to the Attorney General, or to any person al-
leging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of any provision of this
chapter, or regulations promulgated under section 12116 of this title, concerning em-
ployment.
Id. at 760, n. 4.
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tion." A congressional amendment to Title VII in 1972 permitted
the EEOC to bring enforcement actions in federal court 6 to pro-
hibit employer discrimination and determine the appropriate af-
firmative action." A further amendment in 1991 permitted the
EEOC, as a "complaining party," to recover compensatory and pu-
nitive damages. 8
The majority, citing both Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC and
General Telephone Co. v. EEOC, contended that the statutory au-
thority given to the EEOC indicated that the Commission does not
serve as a substitute for the employee. 9 According to Justice Ste-
vens, an arbitration agreement between employee and employer
does not change the EEOC's role in enforcing the employment dis-
crimination aspects of the ADA.2"
The majority noted that the FAA was implemented "to reverse
the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that
had existed at English common law and had been adopted by
American Courts, and to place arbitration agreements on the
same footing as other contracts."2 The extent to which disputes
are subject to arbitration depend on the contract involved-the
16. General Telephone Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 325 (1980). Prior to the 1972
amendment, the EEOC was primarily an investigative agency for discrimination actions.
Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 286.
17. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 286. The statutory language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1)
(1994) provides:
(g) Injunctions; appropriate affirmative action; equitable relief; accrual of back pay;
reduction of back pay; limitations on judicial orders
(1) If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intention-
ally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the
court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment prac-
tice and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but
is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay
(payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may
be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable relief as
the court deems appropriate. Back pay liability shall not accrue from the date more
than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission. Interim earnings
or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discrimi-
nated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable. 42 U.S.C.
2000e-5(g)(1)(1994 ed).
Id. at 286.
18. Waffle House, 534 at 287.
19. Id. In Occidental, the Court held that the EEOC should not be held to California's
one year statute of limitations because the Commission had a duty to investigate and at-
tempt to conciliate before bringing an action. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S.
355 (1977). In General Telephone, the EEOC was not held to Fed. Rule of Civ. Pro. 23 with
regard to class certification before bringing suit. General Telephone, 446 U.S. at 321-22.
20. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 288.
21. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House
FAA does not authorize the court to impose arbitration on parties
if it does not exist within their agreement.22
The court of appeals' decision recognized that the EEOC was not
a party to the arbitration contract, but nevertheless limited the
EEOC's remedy to injunctive relief.23 The court of appeals bal-
anced the "competing policies" between the ADA and the FAA,24
deciding that the policy promoting arbitration outweighed the
EEOC's public interest to pursue victim-specific relief.25
The majority would have agreed with the court of appeals'
analysis had Baker still retained control over the proceedings.26
However, once an employee files a complaint with the EEOC, the
employee is required to refrain from bringing suit for 180 days.
Justice Stevens determined that the Commission, through its in-
vestigation and evaluation, should decide if the public's interest
would be best served by bringing an enforcement suit and likewise
should be left to determine whether public resources should be
utilized to recover victim-specific relief.
2
Waffle House and the dissent argued that the language of Title
VII19 instructed the courts to determine what constituted appro-
priate relief.3" The majority rejected this reading of the statute,
instead concluding that the policy interests of the EEOC were su-
perior even when the EEOC was not a party to the arbitration
agreement.3' Justice Stevens cited Volt Information Sciences, Inc.
v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., where the
Court explicitly prohibited forced arbitration in situations where
the parties did not agree to do so."2
22. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 289.
23. Id. at 290.
24. Id. Justice Stevens disapproved of the Court of Appeals' failure to examine the
language of the arbitration agreement and the statutes granting the Commission's author-
ity in its analysis. Id.
25. Id. The majority noted that the EEOC, as per 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), was required
to make a conciliation attempt prior to filing a claim. Justice Stevens also pointed out that
the number of employment discrimination cases actually pursued by the EEOC represents
a small fraction of the antidiscrimination claims filed every year. Id. at 290, n. 7.
26. Id. at 291.
27. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 291. The employee can sue during the 180 day waiting
period if he receives a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. Id.
28. Id. at 291-92.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1). See also supra note 17 and accompanying text.
30. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 292.
31. Id. at 293. The court of appeals never reached this issue. Id.
32. Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989). See also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 395, 404, n. 12 (1967).
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The majority struggled with the court of appeals' extreme gen-
eralization that victim-specific relief was purely an individual
remedy, while injunctive relief was seen as a purely-public inter-
est remedy that could be achieved even in light of an arbitration
employment agreement.3  According to the Court, the balance
suggested by the court of appeals disregarded the power victim-
specific relief has in curtailing unlawful discriminatory behavior
by employers.34 Justice Stevens reasoned that the court of ap-
peals' "competing policies" decision could limit the number of em-
ployees involved in arbitration agreements that come forward
with their complaints to the EEOC if securing victim-specific relief
was unattainable. 5
The majority concluded by admitting that on some occasions an
employee's actions can affect the EEOC's ability to obtain relief;
however, Baker's situation did not fall into such a category.6
Baker did not attempt to arbitrate or enter into any settlement
independent of the EEOC action.37 Justice Stevens, joined by Jus-
tices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, held that
the EEOC was permitted by statute to seek victim-specific relief
for Baker.38
Justice Thomas, in his dissent, contended that when an em-
ployee agrees to arbitration, the EEOC should honor that agree-
ment and refrain from pursuing victim-specific relief.9 The dis-
sent agreed with the majority that Baker's arbitration agreement
with Waffle House precluded Baker from bringing his action to
court.4' Therefore, Baker could not recover damages for himself
without going through the arbitration process.4'
The dissent noted that, while the EEOC has the statutory right
to bring suit (§ 2000e-5(f)(1)), its right to secure a selected remedy
33. Id. at 294-95. See also Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266-270
(1981).
34. Waffle House, 534 at 295-96. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. at 383.
35. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 296, n. 11.
36. Id. at 296-97. See also Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982); EEOC v.
Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 813 F.2d 1539, 1542 (9" Cir. 1987); EEOC v. U.S. Steel Corp.,
921 F. 2d 489, 495 (3d. Cir. 1990); General Telephone, 446 U.S. at 333.
37. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 297.
38. Id. at 297-98.
39. Id. at 298. In his opening remarks, Justice Thomas stated that the EEOC "must
take a victim of discrimination as it finds him." Id. See also Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA), 9 U.S.C § 1 et seq.
40. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 299.
41. Id. at 299-300.
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was not supported by the statutory language in § 2000e-5(g)(1).42
Justice Thomas explained that the grant of authority as to the
selection of a remedy should be left to the court, as Congress' in-
tent was illustrated by the statutory language.43 Citing examples
of statutory language where the Congressional intent was "appro-
priateness of a remedy," Justice Thomas concluded that the
EEOC's statutory authority fell short of allowing the Commission
to determine remedies. 4
The dissent further stated two reasons why victim-specific relief
would not be appropriate under the circumstances. 45  First, as
stated above, Justice Thomas argued that an employee who signs
an arbitration agreement should not receive more benefits simply
because the EEOC has taken the suit.4 The dissent, citing situa-
tions where the conduct of the employee can affect what relief is
sought by the EEOC,47 argued that, "To the extent that the EEOC
is seeking victim-specific relief in court for a particular employee,
it is able to obtain no more relief for that employee than the em-
ployee could recover for himself by bringing his own lawsuit." 
48
The dissent contended that Baker should not recover victim-
specific relief through the EEOC's action.49 Justice Thomas ar-
gued that since the EEOC has a dual role to represent both the
public interest and the individual interest of the claimant, the
EEOC does in fact serve as a proxy for the employee." While vic-
tim-specific relief can have an impact on the public interest,5 the
42. Id. at 300-01.
43. Id. at 301. See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415-416 (1975);
Selgas v. American Airlines, Inc., 104 F.3d 9, 13, n. 2 (1 Cir. 1997).
44. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 301. See also supra note 17 and accompanying text. The
dissent contended that the language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (1994 ed.) expressly re-
served the right of the court to determine whether or not relief is granted and whether or
not the relief is appropriate. Justice Thomas further contended that if Congress wanted to
give that power to the EEOC, the statute would have been constructed differently. Id at
302-03.
45. Id. at 304.
46. Id.
47. Id. See also EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d 1085, 1091 (5
th Cir. 1987); EEOC v.
Goodyear Aerospace Corp, 813 F.2d 1539, 1543 (9'h Cir. 1987); Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458
U.S. 219, 231-32 (1982).
48. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 305.
49. Id. at 305-06. See also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24; General Telephone, 446 U.S. 318,
325; Occidental, 432 U.S. at 368.
50. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 306-07.




dissent was quick to point out that the impact is limited to the
EEOC's role of seeking sweeping relief for the public at large."
The second reason noted by the dissent that victim-specific re-
lief was inappropriate was that such a remedy would nullify the
arbitration agreement and hinder the FAA's policy of promoting
arbitration. 3 The dissent interpreted the majority's decision to
mean that if the EEOC is the master of its own case, it could ulti-
mately lead to the decision that the EEOC has the authority to
change an arbitration settlement through litigation after the
fact.54 Justice Thomas argued that such a system discourages ar-
bitration agreements by employees and contradicts the policies of
the FAA." As a result, Justice Thomas predicted there would be
fewer settlement agreements, moving more cases back into the
courtroom and ignoring the judicial economy aspect of the FAA."6
The solution, according to Justice Thomas, was for the courts to
reconcile the two statutes so that both could be effective.57 Be-
cause the language of the ADA expressly encourages arbitration
and alternative methods of dispute resolutions, Justice Thomas
found it difficult to imagine that Congress would limit arbitration
of ADA actions where the EEOC decided not to litigate.58 The dis-
sent was not impressed with the statistical data provided by the
majority concerning the small percentage of cases the EEOC actu-
ally litigates every year." The fact that only a small amount of
arbitration agreements would be disregarded was not an accept-
able argument where statutory language instructed the EEOC to
honor the agreements."
The ADA, passed in 1990, represented a watershed moment in
the lives of millions of Americans suffering from disabilities.6' The
52. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 307, n. 10.
53. Id. at 308. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
54. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 310 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
55. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 312 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 313 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R. Co. v. Railway
Labor Executives' Assn., 491 U.S. 490, 510 (1989).
58. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 313 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 314 and note 14 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
60. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
61. LAuRA F. ROTHSTEIN, DISABILITIES AND THE LAw 13 (1992). Congress' decision for
passing the ADA stemmed in part from research showing the existence of over 43 million
disabled Americans. Id. at 1. Developments prior to the passing of the ADA include: acces-
sibility to federal buildings and mass transit, equal protection for handicapped children in
public schools, the creation of advocacy resources for the disabled, the inclusion of conta-
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purpose of the ADA is to "prohibits discrimination on the basis of
disability in employment, State and local government, public ac-
commodations, commercial facilities, transportation, and tele-
communications." ' The term "disability," as described by the
ADA, includes: (a) a physical or mental impairment that substan-
tially limits one or more of the major life activities of such indi-
viduals; (b) a record of such an impairment; or (c) being regarded
as having such an impairment.63 The number of Americans living
with a disability is on the rise, as technological advances prolong
lives while new diseases hinder others."
The ADA's prohibition against employment discrimination of
disabled individuals covers a wide variety of employment activi-
ties, including job application procedures.65 The EEOC is granted
power via the ADA to enforce the statute in the workplace.66 Co-
ordinating with the Attorney General and the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs, the EEOC has enforcement au-
thority over employment discrimination claims filed with the
Commission.
gious diseases as disabilities, and handicapped persons added as a protected class under
the Fair Housing Act. Id. at 11-13.
The leading act in the area of disabilities prior to the passing of the ADA was the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The Act's provisions focused on federal involvement in pro-
grams: nondiscrimination/affirmative action by federal employees and in employment re-
quirements on federal contractors. Section 504 of the Act, seen as the most significant
disability protection prior to the passing of the ADA, applies to federal finance assistance,
requiring nondiscrimination and reasonable accommodations. The Architectural and
Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (ATBCB) also grew out of this Act. In 1978, §
505 was added to the Rehabilitation Act to provide remedies, procedures and rights under
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. Id. at 3-13.
62. United States Department of Justice (A Guide to Disability Rights Law), available
at httpJ/www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/cguide (Aug. 2001).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1990). This definition of disability mirrors the definition of
.an individual with a handicap" under the Rehabilitation Act. ROTHSTEIN, supra n. 70, at
18.
64. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 70, at 2. The author refers to the influx of Acquired Im-
mune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) into society along with life-saving spinal cord proce-
dures as examples of the reason for increased disabilities in America. Id.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1990). The rule also covers "the hiring, advancement, or
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment." Id.
66. See text supra note 15 and accompanying text.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b) (1990). The role of the EEOC prior to the 1972 amendments of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was an informal and usually ineffective conciliation
attempt at best. The Attorney General served as the enforcement authority. The 1972
amendments gave the EEOC the ability to enforce Title VII more effectively, both from a
public interest standpoint and a supplemental vehicle for private actions. (General Tele-
phone, 446 U.S at 326-328).
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An unsettled issue prior to Waffle House was whether the EEOC
served merely as a proxy for an individual plaintiff. 8 A pair of
cases suggested that this was not the case, and that the EEOC
could pursue relief on its own in the public interest." In Occiden-
tal Life Insurance Company v. EEOC, the United State Supreme
Court was asked to determine whether the state statute of limita-
tions could bar the EEOC from bringing suit." While the EEOC
must wait thirty days before invoking its judicial power, neither
Section 706(f) nor any other portion of Title VII required the
EEOC to conclude investigation and conciliation within the state's
statute of limitations in order to bring a "timely" suit.7 There
were instances that allowed the state statute of limitations to take
effect when federal statutes were silent in terms of the amount of
time to bring suit.72  However, this practice was not automatic,
and the policy behind the EEOC's function under the amended
Section 706 still required an investigation and an attempt at an
alternative resolution prior to filing suit.73 This Court also cited
its decision in Albermarle, arguing that when a private individual
causes an inexcusable delay in filing, thus prejudicing the defen-
dant, the court can provide relief.74 The Court believed that the
same should be exercised when the EEOC is the plaintiff, but only
with regard to the time frame between the end of conciliation and
the filing of a lawsuit.75 The Court in Occidental held that the
EEOC does not serve as a mere substitute for the employee.6
68. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 288.
69. Id.
70. 432 U.S. 355, 357 (1977).
71. Id. at 360.
72. Id. at 367.
73. Id. at 367-68
74. Id. at 373. In Albemarle, a delay in the request for backpay in a Title VII
discrimination case was remanded to the district court to determine whether the delay did
in fact prejudice the defendant. 422 U.S at 424.
75. Occidental, 432 U.S. at 373. The language of Title VII, including its policy, allows
the EEOC to investigate and conciliate before bringing a suit, regardless of the length of
the state statute of limitation. Id.
76. Id. at 368-70.
77. 446 U.S. 318, 323 (1980).
78. Id. The Court in General Telephone cited the pertinent language of § 706 (f)(1) of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964:
If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission .... the Commission
has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to
the Commission, the Commission may bring a civil action against any respondent not
a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision named in the charge....
The person or persons aggrieved shall have the right to intervene in a civil action
brought by the Commission .... If a charge filed with the Commission pursuant to
subsection (b) is dismissed by the Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty
Vol. 41234
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In the second case, General Telephone Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S.
318, 325 (1980), the Court determined that the EEOC was not re-
quired to certify a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
when bringing a suit in federal court against an employer who
allegedly participated in discriminatory practices against women.77
In reaching this holding, the Court looked at the language and the
legislative intent of Title VII, both before and after the 1972
amendments." Prior to 1972, the Attorney General served as the
authority for discrimination suits.79 During this time, the Attor-
ney General was never perceived as standing in the place of an
individual."0 Even when victim-specific relief was granted, the
Attorney General was not obligated to certify the class.8 '
Because of the difficulties surrounding the enforcement of Title
VII, the EEOC was given enforcement power via the 1972
amendments. 2 Congress' intent behind giving the EEOC the abil-
ity to bring civil actions in federal court was to overcome "a major
flaw in the operation of Title VII" which only allowed for investi-
gation and remedial mediation. 3 The authority given to the At-
torney General was transferred to the EEOC with the passing of
days from the filing of such charge or the expiration of any period of reference under
subsection (c) or (d), whichever is later, the Commission has not filed a civil action
under this section ... or the Commission has not entered into a conciliation agree-
ment to which the person aggrieved is a party, the Commission... shall so notify the
person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action
may be brought against the respondent named in the charge (A) by the person claim-
ing to be aggrieved or (B) if such charge was filed by a member of the Commission, by
any person whom the charge alleges was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful employ-
ment practice.
Id. at 321.
79. General Telephone, 466 U.S. at 327.
80. Id. at 328.
81. Id. at 327-28.
82. Id. at 325.
83. Id., quoting S. Rep. No. 92-415, 4 (1971).
84. General Telephone, 466 U.S. at 328-29. The Senate, when discussing the 1972
Amendment, expressly intended for the actions of the EEOC to be the same as those
brought by the Attorney General. Id.
85. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 220 (1982). In Ford, a woman who believed
she was passed over for a position because of her gender, filed suit against Ford Motor
Company. Id. at 221-23. Following the commencement of the suit, Ford offered the woman
a position, which she refused to accept. Id. at 222-23.
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the 1972 amendments, and it could bring class action suits with-
out certifying the class under Rule 23.84
Another issue in Waffle House surrounded the impact of an em-
ployee's actions on the EEOC's ability to bring suit. In Ford Motor
Co. v. EEOC, the United States Supreme Court had to determine
whether backpay continued to accrue after the applicant was of-
fered an opportunity to accept the position previously denied be-
cause of discrimination." The majority held that once the appli-
cant rejected the unconditional offer, the accrual of any potential
backpay ceased.86 The Court relied, in part, on the policy behind
Title VII, which promoted returning victims to the workforce ex-
pediently.87
In EEOC v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit examined whether the EEOC may pursue any
claims once the employee settles.88 The court reversed the order of
the district court regarding the EEOC's independent public inter-
est claim, allowing the EEOC to pursue broad injunctive relief.89
Title VII's policy of eradicating employment discrimination al-
lowed the EEOC to pursue its independent public interest claim,
with the court determining that such a claim is not moot despite
the employee settlement." In EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., the em-
ployee was terminated and given severance pay and benefits for a
fixed period of time in exchange for signing an agreement not to
file any claims against the employer.9 ' When the employee filed
an age discrimination claim with the EEOC, his former employer
discontinued the severance package.92 Viewing this turn of events
86. Id. at 232.
87. Id. at 228. The main objective of Title VII is to "end [employment] discrimination."
Id. at 230. The EEOC was barred from pursuing further backpay because of the actions of
the employee in rejecting the job offer. Id. at 241.
88. EEOC v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 813 F.2d 1539, 1541 (9th Cir., 1987).
89. Id. at 1544. Summary judgment, without investigating Goodyear's liability, left
questions of fact that the court needed to resolve. Id.
90. Id. at 1542-43. The EEOC could not recover victim-specific relief following the
settlement. Id.
91. EEOC v. Cosmair, 821 F.2d 1085, 1087 (5h Cir. 1987).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. The injunction sought by the EEOC looked to bar Cosmair from ceasing the
severance payments, from forming similar agreements with other employees, and from
discriminating against those employees who participate in the investigation and/or bring
an age discrimination suit of their own. Id. at 1087-88.
95. Cosmair, 821 F.2d at 1090. The court contended that the public interest in the
EEOC's authorityto enforce the ADEA outweighed the settlement interest. Id
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as retaliation for his age discrimination claim, the employee filed
another claim with the EEOC, this time asserting that the former
employer unlawfully retaliated by eliminating the severance
package.93
When the EEOC was granted a preliminary injunction, the em-
ployer appealed and the court was forced to decide if such an
agreement prevented the EEOC from bringing suit.94 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that while the employee
could waive his rights to bring suit, it went against public policy to
allow an employee to waive his right to file a claim with the
EEOC.95 The court pointed out that the employee could waive not
only his right to bring a claim but also his right to recover dam-
ages recovered by the EEOC on his behalf.96
A final issue in Waffle House was to determine the FAA's role in
general and employment contracts. As guidance, the Court exam-
ined its previous decision in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v.
Board of Trustees.97 The issue in Volt was whether the California
96. Id. at 1091. The injunctive relief was upheld, minus the portion disallowing the
employer from obtaining waivers from other employees. Id. at 1091-92.
97. 489 U.S. 468, (1989).
98. Id. at 470. The contract contained both a choice of law clause and an arbitration
clause, with the California Arbitration Act serving as the governing law. Id. Through
contract, the California Arbitration Act could preempt the Federal Arbitration Act, pro-
vided that the language of the arbitration clause reflected such an agreement between the
parties. Id.
99. Id. at 472-73.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 485.
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Arbitration Act preempted the FAA.98 In examining the language
of the FAA, the Court stated that the policy behind the act was to
enforce private arbitration agreements when applicable. 99 The act
was not designed to force arbitration in situations where there
was no pre-existing agreement, or to compel arbitration when the
rules of arbitration established by the parties did not lead to arbi-
tration given the circumstances.' The Court held that the parties
could contract to put California arbitration rules into their agree-
ment. O' Provided that the terms of the agreement were enforced,
the Court concluded that the outcome not to arbitrate was accept-
able under the FAA.
In analyzing the battle between the power of the EEOC and the
policy goals of the FAA, the Supreme Court's decision in Waffle
House appears to follow its former line of reasoning: EEOC claims
will at times receive special consideration. In both Occidental and
General Telephone, the Supreme Court allowed the EEOC to side
step certain procedural and statutory rules that conflicted with
the EEOC's statutory authority.' 3 While such a power is not ex-
pressly written within the EEOC's statutory language, the Court
interpreted the Commission's power broadly.
A case can be made that the nature of the EEOC claim, giving
rise to discrimination in the workplace, justifies such a broad in-
terpretation. While the majority was only called upon to rational-
ize the difference, or lack thereof, between injunctive and make-
whole relief, had the Court in fact announced the supremacy of the
EEOC to bring suit and determine remedies? As pointed out by
the majority, only a small fraction of those cases filed with the
EEOC will go to trial.' If the small number of cases, coupled with
the nature of the alleged infractions, allow the EEOC to have
greater power than the private citizens who enter into employ-
ment contracts, the underlying theme insinuates that such ex-
traordinary protection must be afforded to balance the reality of
102. Volt Information, 489 U.S. at 476-79.
103. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 287-88.
104. Id. at 290, n. 7.
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boilerplate contracts created to protect the employer. While the
decision was a reflection of a public welfare stance by the Court,
the dissent viewed the decision as lessening the validity of an in-
dividual employee/employer arbitration agreement.
The question remains whether such a decision will have a det-
rimental affect on employers in their usage of arbitration agree-
ments. The short answer is that this does not appear likely. Nei-
ther does it appear that the decision will hinder judicial efficiency.
The majority's decision stated that there are times when victim-
specific relief cannot be obtained by the EEOC based on the ac-
tions of the employee.' 5 Signing an agreement to arbitrate, ac-
cording to the Court, is not one such action unless there is the po-
tential for double recovery or unjust enrichment.
The decision in Waffle House places employees, along with their
attorneys, on notice that broad arbitration agreements will not
generally provide protection against EEOC suits for either injunc-
tive or victim-specific relief. Arbitration agreements will continue
to find their way into employment contracts, with the vast major-
ity of suits being settled via arbitration. The effectiveness and
efficiency of arbitration far outweighs the minimal risk of an
EEOC action.
Janelle M. Fleming
105. Id. at 296-297.
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